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INTRODUCTION 
 
In politics few notions are as popular as the idea of a division between the 
left and the right. The concept emerged at the end of the 18th century when 
political life in France meant the dichotomy between supporters of the 
revolution and supporters of the king. Over time, political parties developed 
these initial differences into complex views over government. The contrast 
between protectionist state and laissez-faire policies or between social-liberal 
and conservative values were greatly nuanced to accommodate the existence of 
more competitors in multi-party systems. Also, while in the beginning these 
views were limited to national states, in contemporary times they include also 
international or supranational politics, e.g. in Europe there are issues related to 
European Union (EU). These evolutions are associated to several ideologies 
(and policies on the implementation side) that allowed electoral competitors to 
distinguish themselves, mainly for voters, on the political space1. It is precisely 
this diversity that raises interpretation problems regarding the meaning of the 
left-right divide. Many scholars referred to the danger of oversimplification of 
reality when dealing with analytical concepts based on this division2. Others 
tried to conceptualize the left-right axis by suggesting that the core meaning of 
the distinction is the extent to which one supports or rejects egalitarian social 
                                                 
1
 Two of the most influential studies with focus on ideologies and mapping along left-right 
axis are Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, St. Martin’s Press, 
New York, 1985; Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1996. 
2
 See, for example, Roger Eatwell, “The Nature of the Right. Is There an ‘Essentialist’ 
Philosophical Core”, in Roger Eatwell, Noel O’Sullivan (eds.), The Nature of the Right: 
European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789, Pinter, London, 1989, 
pp. 47-60 or Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, Dennis Farlie (eds.), Party Identification and 
Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition, ECPR Press, Colchester, 
2010. 
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change3. And others argued in favor of a multi-dimensional political space in 
which left and right can acquire or change meaning4. 
In spite of conceptual difficulties and practical challenges, the left-right 
axis remained deeply entrenched in political discourse. Candidates, political 
parties and voters use it frequently in elections to express policy preferences, 
argue for a position, or justify their way of action. So far, the political science 
literature has focused extensively on party positions and voters’ alignment or 
self-placement as a response to the supply side5. Less attention has been paid to 
the self-placement of candidates in relation to that of their parties. Such an issue 
is relevant especially because contemporary political parties act in many cases 
as unitary actors but intra-party divisions are increasingly visible6. This article 
seeks to partly fill this void in the literature and analyzes the ideological 
agreement between subjective positioning of Romanian candidates and political 
parties on the left-right axis in the most recent European election. In addition to 
this general comparison, it tries to identify whether party affiliation (left vs. 
right), age of the candidates, position on the list and experience in the party 
make a difference in the different placement. These indicators were selected to 
check the extent to which congruence is related to candidate profile or to 
broader systemic elements. The choice of this type of election was not random: 
following the 2008 change of the electoral system for the national legislative 
elections7, European elections are the only ones organized in Romania where 
voting takes place on closed-list proportional representation. The latter, as 
earlier research has shown, is party centered and thus enhances connections 
between candidates and political parties. Consequently, these are the elections 
in which we would expect convergence between candidates and party 
                                                 
3
 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1989. 
4
 Kenneth Benoit, Michael Laver, Party Policy in Modern Democracies, Routledge, 
London, 2006; Kenneth Benoit, Michael Laver, “The Dimensionality of Political Space: 
Epistemological and Methodological Considerations”, European Union Politics, vol. 13, 
no. 2, 2012, pp. 194-218. 
5
 One of the first attempt to illustrate the complexity of voter self-placement was Samuel H. 
Barnes et al., Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, Sage, 
Beverly Hills, 1979. 
6
 Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, Richard Katz (eds.), Party Discipline and Parliamentary 
Government, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1999; Michael Laver, “Divided 
Parties, Divided Government”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 1, 1999, pp. 5-
29; Daniela Giannetti, Kenneth Benoit (eds.), Intra-Party Politics and Coalition 
Governments, Routledge, London, 2008; John Carey, Legislative Voting and 
Accountability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 
7
 Mihail Chiru, Ionuţ Ciobanu, “Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change: The 
Case of Romania”, CEU Political Science Journal, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 192-231; 
Sergiu Gherghina, George Jiglău, “Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? Understanding 
the 2008 Romanian Electoral System”, Representation, vol. 48, no. 4, 2012, pp. 445-459. 
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placement, on the one hand, and high level of attention paid by candidates to the 
political stances of their parties. It is the least likely case for differences. 
Romania is an ideal setting to test the existence of ideological congruence since 
its party politics is characterized by cartelization, government coalitions include 
a variety of actors, and the ideological polarization is limited8. This exploratory 
study uses data from a candidate survey conducted during the electoral 
campaign in April-May 2014. 
 The first section summarizes the recent developments in Romanian 
politics (period 2009-2014) with an emphasis on the left-right positioning of the 
main political actors. It includes also a brief presentation of the parliamentary 
political parties and a short description of the newly emerged parties that 
competed in the 2014 European election. Next, I provide details about the data 
used for analysis (candidate survey), variables included in this study and their 
measurement, and methodology. The third section presents the empirical 
findings with emphasis on differences between candidate self-placement and 
their subjective positioning on their parties on the left-right axis. The 
conclusions wrap-up the discussion about ideological disagreement and indicate 
potential directions for further research.  
 
 
LEFT AND RIGHT IN ROMANIAN POLITICS 
 
Media and political scientists have equally considered the recent 
European elections in Romania as a practice for the presidential elections at the 
end of the year9. The predominance of national issues in the electoral campaign 
for these elections is additional empirical evidence in favor of such an 
argument. For example, many political competitors did not have a manifesto 
with policy ideas and views on European issues. The absence of a manifesto 
determined quite heterogeneous discourses from candidates of those parties 
focusing on a broad array of issues from economic hardships and poverty to 
corruption and dysfunctional state apparatus; all these were mostly about 
national level. Among the political parties that presented a manifesto, few were 
those that focused on European issues, e.g. National Liberal Party (PNL), 
People’s Movement Party (PMP). The experience of their candidates as 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP) appeared to be helpful in shaping a 
                                                 
8
 Sergiu Gherghina, “Rewarding the ‘Traitors’? Legislative Defection and Re-Election in 
Romania”, Party Politics, online first 2014. 
9
 For two examples, see the forum dedicated to European elections on pp. 4-5 in the 
Timpul, vol. 24, no. 182, 24 May 2014, and Sorina Soare, “Romania: A Preview of the 
2014 Presidential Elections?,” in Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola 
Maggini(eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014, CISE, Roma, 2014, pp. 235-
242. 
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document dealing with issues on the European agenda. In light of these 
observations the May 2014 elections have to be seen in the context of 
evolutions from the domestic political arena. This section focuses on the 
developments since 2009 because that was when the previous European and 
presidential elections took place and around that time a discourse about left and 
right became prominent in Romanian politics. The first sub-section presents the 
most important political parties, their general positioning, and changes on the 
left-right axis during the entire post-communist period.  
 
 
The Parliamentary Political Parties 
 
The 2009 European elections were the first in which Romanian voters 
elected their representatives in the European Parliament (EP) for a full term in 
office. They were organized in the context of a grand coalition government that 
brought together after almost two decades the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
and the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL). Their origins suggest that they are 
both successor parties of the communist party from the previous regime10. They 
emerged after a split in the National Salvation Front (FSN), the umbrella 
organization winning the first post-communist elections in Romania. In 1992, 
following an internal divergence of opinions, the faction led by Petre Roman, 
recently dismissed from the prime-minister position at that time, won the 
internal elections against the ideological faction belonging to country president 
Ion Iliescu. Roman’s party continued for one more year with the label FSN and 
later became the Democrat Party (and later PDL). The losing side of the internal 
elections formed the Democratic National Salvation Front that was called Party or 
Social Democracy in Romania (between 1993 and 2001) and PSD (since 2001). 
The PSD is the largest Romanian party with an average electoral support 
higher than 30%. It won the popular vote in five out the six legislative elections 
since its creation and participated in four coalition governments (three times as 
leading party). Following the split in 1992, the PSD retained most of party elites 
and local branches of the FSN and thus ended up with a relevant organizational 
heritage similar to that of the other successor parties in the region11. The PSD 
kept its identity as successor party and positioned itself to the left of the 
political space with emphasis on heavy protectionist state, social-egalitarian 
policies and national oriented discourse. Its dominance on the left was 
                                                 
10
 Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Separated at Birth or Separated by Birth? The Communist 
Successor Parties in Romania and Hungary,” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 
13, no. 1, 1999, pp. 117-147. 
11
 John T. Ishiyama, “The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organizational 
Development in Post-Communist Politics”, Political Research Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 1, 
1999, pp. 87-112. 
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strengthened after the merger with the center left Romanian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDR) in 2001 – this coincided with the name change from PDSR to 
PSD – a party with historical roots in the pre-communist period. This allowed 
the PSD to present itself as a political party with social-democratic roots back in 
the 19th century12. In addition, the merger facilitated the PSD access to the 
International Socialist and to the Party of European Socialists. The clear 
positioning to the left did not impede the PSD to closely cooperate with the 
Conservative Party (PC, formerly known as the Romanian Humanist Party, 
PUR) and to form electoral or political alliances on a regular basis since 2000. 
This decision was mainly triggered by the media outlets owned by the PC 
founder Dan Voiculescu: the alliance granted the PSD free access to these 
outlets. In 2008, following the national legislative election, the PSD joined the 
PDL in forming a grand coalition government (more than 70% of seats in 
Parliament) that lasted less than a year. The PSD left the government and 
proposed its own candidate to the 2009 presidential election. In 2011, the PSD 
forms together with the PNL and the PC a large political alliance (Social 
Democratic Union, USL) that comfortably won the 2012 legislative election.  
The PDL became, in the early 2000s the second largest party in post-
communist Romania. After the 1992 separation from the PSD, the party adopted 
the name Democratic Party (PD) in 1993. Also situated at the left, the party was 
somewhat closer to the center than the PSD with moderate state intervention 
and social protection measures. It ran in an electoral alliance with the PSDR in 
the 1996 election and got coopted in the center-right coalition government for 
the 1996-2000 term in office. The PD separated from the PSDR (that later 
merged with the PSD) and, due to the negative perceptions of its performance in 
government, obtained poor electoral results in the 2000 election. The change of 
leader in 2001 set the party on an ascending slope in terms of electoral support 
and its new leader, won the 2004 presidential elections. Following this success 
the party decided to shift from center-left ideology to center-right, a declarative 
shift that would allow the party to differentiate itself from the PSD. Another 
indicator of the ideological re-positioning of the party was the merger with the 
Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), a splinter from the PNL, immediately after the 
2007 European election; this merger meant the relabeling of the party from PD 
into PDL. Moreover, the PDL left the Socialist International and joined the 
European People’s Party in the European Parliament. As a result of these 
changes, the PD advertised itself as a representative of the right side of the 
political spectrum since the 2008 legislative election.  
                                                 
12
 The history section on the PSD website starts with the origins of social-democracy in the 
19th century, drawing a line of duirect succession until the contemporary PSD. For details, 
see http://www.psd.ro/despre/cine-suntem/istorie/, last accessed on 11 July 2014. 
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The PNL, third largest party in the Romanian Parliament, is a center-right 
party that combines a minimal state intervention, emphasis on entrepreneurs and 
social liberal values. Although its history was marked by a large number of 
splits and mergers13, there was no relevant ideological shift. This happened also 
because most splits and mergers involve actors that left and returned to the 
PNL. For example, internal factions of PNL that left the party (PNL Câmpeanu) 
made further alliances and returned to the PNL a few years later or in a different 
format. Three mergers with political parties situated at the center-right of the 
political axis (in 1998 with the Party of Civic Alliance. In 2001 with the Party 
Alternative for Romania and in 2004 with the Union of Right Forces) indicate 
the PNL’s willingness to gather around them all the forces that might counter-
balance the social-democratic domination in the country. The PNL was part of 
the center-right electoral alliance winning the 1996 elections and was three 
times part of the coalition government. During 2007-2008, liberals led a minority 
government (supported by the PSD on the basis of a “silent agreement”). 
Next to these three political parties, the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) had a constant presence in Parliament. With 
an ethnic focus, the UDMR can hardly be positioned on the left-right axis 
because it combines different policies. Its aim is to represent the interests of the 
Hungarian minority and that is one reason for which its policies are quite 
flexible. This ideological flexibility makes the party a valuable coalition partner 
for each of the three parties presented before; it was in many government 
coalitions between 1992 and 2014. Another party that is difficult to position on 
a left-right axis is the populist People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (PPDD), created 
in 2011 and third in the 2012 legislative election. On ideological grounds, the 
party is a combination of right conservatism and radical nationalism with left 
statements referring to the role played by the state and extensive social 
protection. In this context, while some elements bring it closer to being radical 
right, there are several other issues that counter-balance this perspective. The 
radical right Greater Romania Party (PRM) was created before the 1992 
elections and gained seats in the legislature on a regular basis until 2008. It was 
for a short period part of the 1992-1996 parliamentary majority and reached its 
peak in the 2000 elections when got second in the legislative elections with almost 
20% of votes. It is clearly positioned at the right extreme of the political space. 
These brief descriptions of the Romanian political parties that gained 
access to Parliament – and also competed in the 2014 European election – 
indicate a diversity of positions on the left-right axis. For two decades, the PSD 
occupies the left side of the spectrum, while the right side is divided between 
several competitors: PNL, PDL, and PNŢCD. To these we may add the position 
                                                 
13
 Sergiu Gherghina, Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Enhancing Voter Loyalty, Routledge, London, 2014. 
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of the PMP, a splinter from the PDL, which also adopted a center-right ideology 
in its program. Furthermore, there are parties with appeal to particular segments 
of society (UDMR to ethnics and PRM to extremist voters) and parties with a 
diffuse appeal (PPDD). Let us now turn to the political dynamic in the most 
recent five years.  
 
 
Left and Right since 2009 
 
Since 2009, the Romanian political arena has been quite active in terms 
of party formation and the creation of political or electoral alliances. Two 
contrasting tendencies could be observed in this time interval. On the one hand, 
there were attempts to mobilize segments of the electorate by bringing together 
political parties with similar or different ideological profile. On the other hand; 
all these alliances collapsed and new parties emerged, thus leading to a higher 
fragmentation of competition. The formation of political and electoral alliances 
is slightly more complicated. Following the departure from government and the 
dramatic loss of presidential election – both in 2009 – the PSD became the 
largest opposition party in Parliament. Together with the PNL and the PC it 
formed a large political alliance USL (with parliamentary majority) that could 
in a first phase overthrow the minority government led by PDL and in a second 
phase win the parliamentary election scheduled for the end of 2012. This 
alliance formed of left, center right and right wing parties had a catch-all 
strategy and discourse aiming to mobilize different segments of the electorate. 
Consequently, it was not surprising that in the 2012 legislative election the 
alliance received approximately 60% of the votes and almost 70% of the seats 
in both Chambers of Parliament. Before that, the alliance succeeded in casting 
two parliamentary votes of no confidence against two consecutive PDL 
governments. After these failures of the PDL to form the government, the 
country President had to appoint one of the USL presidents as Prime-minister. 
In less than two months after this decision, the USL leaders initiated an 
impeachment procedure against the President14. Although voted in Parliament 
and by a large majority of those who participated in referendum, the suspension 
could not be validated due to the failure to reach the 50% participation 
threshold, i.e. the turnout was slightly above 46%. 
The domination of the political life by the USL came to an end in the 
beginning of 2014 when, after conflicts with the PSD, the PNL exited the 
alliance and entered opposition. The remaining parties competed on joint lists 
                                                 
14
 For details, see Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu, “The Failure of Cohabitation: 
Explaining the 2007 and 2012 Institutional Crises in Romania”, East European Politics & 
Societies, vol. 27, no. 4, 2013, pp. 668-684. 
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for the 2014 European election under a common label – the names of the three 
parties: PSD, UNPR and PC. The third party was the National Union for the 
Progress of Romania (UNPR) that joined the USL after the local elections in 
2012. This party was formed in 2010 by a group of independent members of 
parliament (MP) who left the PSD and the PNL to support the country president 
and the PDL government. As a mixture of people originating in the two parties 
occupying different positions on the left-right axis, the UNPR lacks a clear 
ideology. However, the party claims to be center left because, part of the 
process of joining the USL, it formed with the PSD the Center Left Alliance. In 
this sense, the former PSD MPs are in a political alliance with their former party 
while few PNL MPs have found their place in a center left party.  
While the UNPR it was the only party with intra-parliamentary origins, it 
was not the only one formed in this period of time. In the summer of 2012, after 
the failure to pass a vote of no confidence, the former Prime-minister of a 
government supported by the PDL, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu formed a political 
party called the Civic Force (FC). With a declared center right ideology the 
party ran alone only in the 2014 European election. In 2012 it joined an 
electoral alliance with the PDL and the PNŢCD called the Right Romania 
Alliance (ARD). The poor electoral results did not ensure a long life to this 
alliance and disintegrated several months after. Another center-right political 
party formed in this period was the PMP, a splinter from the PDL. Following 
the loss of the internal election in the PDL, the faction supported by the country 
president left the party in 2013 and formed the PMP as political party in January 
2014. In its short existence the PMP ran in the 2014 European election and 
secured two seats in the EP.  
After five years of dynamic on the political scene the result is a solid and 
unitary political entity on the left side (PSD and the alliance around it) and 
many political parties sharing the right side of the political space. This 
fragmentation fueled discourses about the possibility and necessity of a unified 
“right” in Romanian politics. New political or electoral alliances between the 
political parties were envisaged. For example, the FC and the PMP, the newly 
emerged parties presented above, thought about merging or forming an alliance 
for the European election. None of the two happened and the FC failed to get 
parliamentary representation. Moreover, after the European election the PNL 
and the PDL agreed to form an electoral alliance for the presidential 
competition at the end of this year: the Christian Liberal Alliance (ACL). The 
two parties were in a political alliance in 2004 when they got second in the 
legislative election, but the project ended as soon as the PDL (at that time the 
PD) left the coalition government.  
More important for this article, such evolutions led to a discursive 
separation between the left and the right in the last couple of years. This 
separation has been augmented both by politicians and journalists from press 
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and television. In their attempt to differentiate form competitors, politicians 
often referred to themselves as belonging to the right or to the left, while their 
opponents were portrayed as the representatives of the other side. Journalists 
used a similar approach for two reasons: 1) many private media outlets have 
partisan preferences and the portrayal of parties is biased and 2) the left-right 
division is easy to understand by the public and arguably appealing. The 
consequence was a type of discourse “left vs. right” in which political 
competitors have to clearly express the allegiance to one of the sides. Even 
more, the public discourse of political parties to the right illustrated a general 
tendency of differentiation from the left social democrats. While this strategy 
could be beneficial for the parties in terms of vote appeal, it could also represent 
a source of pressure for their own candidates. Those who ran for office had to 
consider their position along these lines and such a situation was likely to be 
reflected in ideological disagreement. For example, candidates could consider 
themselves more moderate or more radical that the party they represent. This 
article tests to what extent this is the case in the 2014 European election and 
what factors may be associated with it. The following section briefly presents 
the research design of this study.  
 
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A total number of 572 candidates belonging to 15 political parties 
competed for the 32 available seats in the EP. The independent candidates are 
not counted because their self-placement on the left right axis is not relevant in 
the context of this analysis. Out of these, 274 candidates received an e-mail with 
the link to a web survey questionnaire. The survey did not reach every candidate 
because their e-mail addresses were not available. In spite of this shortcoming, 
there was no systematic bias in the number of invitations sent per party: no 
party received considerably fewer invitations for its candidates than others. 
Also, the availability of addresses did not vary according to the position 
occupied on the list. Since the survey was designed to focus on the attitudes and 
opinions of candidates during the electoral campaign, the data collection took 
place between 29 April and 20 May. It started several days after the official 
beginning of campaign and ended several days before the elections. A number 
of 68 candidates from 14 political parties replied (a response rate of almost 25% 
from the number of invitations sent). In general, the distribution of respondents 
was balanced in terms of age, parties that gained seats in the EP, and list 
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position15. The questions regarding self-placement and positioning of their own 
party (see below) were answered by 56 candidates, belonging to 12 political 
parties, distributed as follows: New Republic Party (PNR) (11), FC (9), 
Socialist Alternative Party (PAS) (7), PSD (5), PMP (5), PNL (4), UDMR (4), 
Green Party (PV) (3), PDL (2), Party of Social Justice (PDS) (2), PNŢCD (2), 
and PPDD (2). The survey sample is not random probabilistic and the results 
presented in the following section are not representative. Their applicability is 
limited to survey respondents but it is useful in observing some trends. 
The two key variables for this analysis are related to the subjective 
placement of the candidates on the left-right axis. The first is a self-placement 
measure and was the answer to the following question: “In politics people 
discuss often about left and right. On a 1 (left) to 10 (right) scale, where would 
you position yourself on such a scale?”. The second variable asked candidates 
to position their party on the same left-right scale. The questions were asked 
successively, in this order. The difference between the score chosen for the first 
question and the score for the second question gives the level of disagreement 
between self-placement and the position of the party. For example, a candidate 
who considers that she is 7 on the left right scale and her party is also a 7 will 
have a score 0 for disagreement; this means that there is ideological agreement 
between the candidate and party. A candidate who gives a score of 7 to the first 
question and a score of 6 to the second will have an ideological disagreement 
score equal to +1. This means that the candidate is positioned slightly to the 
right than the party. Conversely, if a candidate gives a score of 7 to the first 
question and one of 9 to the second, the disagreement score will be -2, i.e. the 
candidate is more to the left than the party. While these issues are relevant for 
the general descriptions, the analysis uses a recoded version. In this sense, the 
extent of disagreement does not account for deviations to the left or to the right. 
This is the reason for which similar deviations are merged. For example, if one 
candidate has a score of -2 and another has a score of +2, they belong to the 
same category – disagreement of two units relative to their parties.  
As explained in the introduction, the analysis will check whether several 
variables are associated with the levels of disagreement: party affiliation, age of 
the candidates, position on the list, and experience in the party. The party 
affiliation is a dichotomous variable that differentiates between parties to the 
left and parties to the right. While I agree that this is a quite simplistic approach 
for a series of reasons (e.g. it ignores differences between moderate and radical 
actors on the same side of the political space), it helps observing some patterns 
among the competitors. Parties on the left are considered PAS, PDS, and PSD 
                                                 
15
 Details about the candidate survey are available in Sergiu Gherghina, “What Comes 
Next? A Candidate Perspective on the EP Policy Priorities until 2019”, Romanian Journal 
of European Affairs, vol. 14, no. 3, 2014: forthcoming. 
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(this includes UNPR and PC), while the parties on the right are FC, PDL, PMP, 
PNL, PNR, and PNŢCD. The coding used objective indicators such as the 
manifestos used by political parties in previous elections or political programs 
from their websites. Three other parties were not coded on the left right axis due 
to their populist rhetoric (PPDD), specific appeal towards an ethnic group 
(UDMR) and single-issue orientation (PV). The age of candidates is measured 
as number of years until the moment of European election on 25 May 2014. The 
position is as straightforward as the name indicates, being an ordinal measure 
corresponding to the position of the candidate on the list of her party. Data for 
age and list position are taken from the publicly available lists of candidates. 
Finally, experience in the party is measured as the answer to the question: 
“Have you been a candidate for this party before?”. Multiple answers were 
possible and the available options were: “yes, in national parliamentary 
elections”, “yes, in European elections”, “yes, in local elections” and “no”. 
Based on the provided answers I created an additive index with values ranging 
from 0 (no previous candidacy) to 3 (candidate in all three types of elections).  
The methods used for analysis are limited to descriptive statistics in the 
form of cross-tabulations or correlations (depending on the type of variables). 
The following section includes the findings and starts with a general description 
of the levels of ideological disagreement.  
 
 
IDEOLOGICAL DISAGREEMENT AND ITS 
VARIATIONS 
 
Figure 1 depicts the candidate self-placement and their perception about 
party positioning on the left-right axis. The a) distribution indicates a tendency 
of the Romanian candidates to position themselves in the right side of the 
political space. It is somewhat surprising to observe that 20 candidates see 
themselves as being positioned at the end of the continuum (value 10 on the 
scale). Since not many of these respondents belong to the radical right parties, 
such a distribution is likely to be partly determined by a wrong interpretation of 
what the scale is about. Instead of considering 10 as an extreme value, the 
candidates probably saw this as the ideal match of a right wing ideology. 
Another possible explanation for the tendency to choose the maximum value on 
the axis can be empirically linked with the direction of political discourses 
before the electoral campaign. The desire to distinguish themselves from left 
wing parties could have driven candidates in adopting extreme positions. It is 
relevant to note that things are different with candidates who chose value 1 on 
the axis. It is less surprising to see this decision in the context of many 
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candidates belonging to the left-wing PAS or the PDS; the political programs of 
each party position them quite close to that area.  
 
a) self-placement     b) party placement 
 
Figure 1. Candidate Self-Placement and Subjective Party Positioning 
on the Left-Right Axis 
 
In comparison, the b) distribution depicts the perceived positioning of the 
parties to which the candidates belong. One of the differences that can be 
immediately observed is that fewer candidates position their parties at the 
highest value on the axis; to much less extent this is true also for the lowest 
value (1). Another difference is that value 4 (center-left) has a correspondent. At 
the same time, there is a visible change between the values 7 and 8 between the 
two sides of the graph. Overall, these bar charts indicate the existence of 
ideological differences that drive the analysis in this section. 
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How much disagreement is there between the self-placement of 
candidates and the subjective positioning of their parties? According to the level 
and direction of disagreement presented in Figure 2, 64% (the horizontal axis 
includes percentages) of the candidates answered identically when asked about 
their position and that of their party on the left right-scale. The rest of 36% 
(slightly more than one third of the candidates) displayed various degrees of 
disagreement. Out of these 9% were positioned to the left than their parties, 
while three times more positioned themselves more to the right than their 
parties. In this category, most respondents indicated a disagreement of one or 
two positions but there were also cases were disagreement as high as three or 
five positions. These differences are reflected in the figure that has on the 
horizontal axis the level of disagreement; minus scores means positioning to the 
left of the candidate. In light of this evidence we can conclude that one out of 
three candidates has ideological disagreement with her party. Quite often this 
takes the form of a positioning to the right of the candidate relative to the party.  
 
 
  
Figure 2. The Disagreement Score between Candidate and Party Positioning 
 
As previously explained, the analysis presented in this section recodes the 
values presented in Figure 2. It merges similar scores with different sign (e.g. -2 
and 2) into a common category. The variation of disagreement is the following: 
score of 1 (15%), score of 2 (12%), score of 3 (5%) and score of 5 (4%). Table 
1 presents the distribution of these levels of disagreement according to 
candidate belonging to a left or to a right political party. The removal of three 
parties decreased the number of candidates to 47 out of whom 33 are from 
parties to the right. The difference is not surprising given that the coding 
presented in the previous section took into account twice as many parties to the 
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right than those from the left side of the political space. The percentages in 
Table 1 – calculated within the party type - indicate the general absence of 
differences between candidates to the left and to the right when disagreeing with 
their parties. In other words, they disagree to fairly similar extents irrespective 
of their positioning in the political space. Approximately two thirds of 
candidates agree with their parties, while minimum to moderate disagreement 
(scores of 1 and 2) can be observed for 22 and 24% of the candidates in any of 
the two types (left or right). A small difference appears if we look at the 
direction of disagreement (the one reflected in Figure 2). Percentages that are 
not reported here indicate that in case of small disagreements candidates from 
parties to the left tend to position themselves more to the left than their political 
parties, while candidates belonging to parties of the right see themselves more 
to the right. These centrifugal tendencies on both sides of the center – in the 
one-dimensional space assumed here – confirm the discussion from the section 
on political developments in Romania. The dichotomy from the political 
discourse could represent a source of pressure that pushes candidates to 
perceive themselves more radical than their parties. The absence of a real 
difference between the candidates is also illustrated by the low value of the 
association coefficient (somer’s d, -0.05). 
 
Table 1 
The Level of Disagreement according to Party Affiliation (Left-Right) 
 
 Left (%) Right (%) 
Same score 64 67 
1 8 12 
2 14 12 
3 0 9 
5 14 0 
 
Table 2 includes the Spearman correlation coefficients between 
ideological agreement and age, position on the list, and party experience of 
candidates. To begin with age, the negative value of the coefficient (-0.28, 
significant at 0.05) indicates a moderate tendency of younger candidates to be in 
disagreement with their parties. This finding is not surprising given that older 
candidates are usually more socialized and accustomed with how the party 
works and what is stands for. There is a positive correlation (not reported in this 
article) between the age of candidates and length of activity in their party. At 
the same time, young people who get involved in politics are oriented towards 
changes and are sometimes more radical than the party. This element is in line 
with the trends illustrated in Figure 2.  
The position on the list does not appear to make much of a difference. 
The low value of the correlation coefficient (0.07) indicates a weak relationship 
in the sense that candidates occupying lower positions on the list are slightly 
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more likely to disagree with arty ideology than the others. This piece evidence 
is also quite intuitive since usually top positions on the list are occupied by 
party elites who have often played an active role in defining party ideology. 
Lower positions are sometimes offered to newcomers to illustrate the openness 
of the party and to encourage them to continue their activity for the party. 
Consequently, it is likely to have a higher ideological diversity towards the end 
of the list.  
  
Table 2 
Correlations between Level of Disagreement and Age, Position on the List, 
and Party Experience of Candidates 
 
 Correlation coefficient 
Candidate age -0.28* 
Position on the List 0.07 
Experience in the party 0.10 
N 56 
* p < 0.05 
 
Experience in the party is also weakly correlated with the level of 
disagreement (0.1). According to the positive coefficient it means that 
candidates who ran in elections for their current party disagree more with their 
party than the other candidates. At a glance, the results appear counter-intuitive 
since one would expect such candidates with experience in the party to share its 
ideology. The other side of the coin, and a possible explanation for this 
empirical observation, is that previous electoral competitions have helped 
candidates understanding the differences between them and the party. In this 
sense, experience plays the role of raising awareness about own ideological 
position separated from that of the party.  
  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article analyzed the ideological agreement between subjective 
positioning of Romanian candidates and political parties on the left-right axis in 
the most recent European election. The exploratory study showed the existence 
of ideological disagreement and tested the extent to which some variables were 
associated with this disagreement. The empirical evidence revealed that one 
third of the Romanian candidates who answered the survey conducted in April-
May 2014 have a different ideological position than that of their party. Usually, 
candidates see themselves as positioned more to the right of the political space 
as the parties they come from. This trend can be linked to the public discourse 
about left and right divisions in Romanian politics over the last five years. 
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Many politicians and journalists sought to depict the political space through the 
lenses of a polarized competition. This type of discourse can be one potential 
explanation for the existence of ideological disagreement. 
Age of the candidate correlates the highest with different attitudes and 
show that the younger the candidates are the more they defect from party 
ideology. Meanwhile, the objective positioning of the party (left vs. right), 
candidate position on the list for European election and experience in the party 
(previous candidacies) correlate weakly with the level of disagreement. While 
the choice of variables is not guided by a solid theoretical reason, it is relevant 
to note that none of the factors directly related to politics such as experience in 
the party or position on the list correlate highly with ideological disagreement. 
This intriguing conclusion opens the floor fur further research in this direction. 
On the one hand, it is likely to have other political features of the candidates 
such as position in the party, length of activity in the party, or intensity of 
activity as good correlates of agreement. All these should be further explored in 
a separate piece of research. On the other hand, age may be a proxy for political 
attitudes such as willingness to change something in the party or attitudes 
towards a different vision of politics. To fully grasp its meaning, future studies 
have to closely investigate the existence of such relationships. 
The key finding of this study is the existence of ideological disagreement 
between candidates and their parties. In spite of its inherent limitations, this 
study can be a useful point of departure for further analysis. One way to proceed 
is to provide explanations of such disagreements. Although the use of causal 
statistical models for 56 candidates can be highly problematic, there is room for 
maneuver with respect to qualitative insights. In this respect, one may use either 
qualitative follow-up interviews with candidates or other items from the 
candidate survey presented in this article. Another avenue for further research is 
the understanding of what Romanian candidates mean by left and right. This 
may also clarify why so many positioned quite far from the center of the 
political space although that is usually the place where many voters are located.  
 
